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Yugoslav anti-Axis Resistance, 
1939-1941: The Case of 
Vane Ivanovlc 
DEJAN DJOKIC 
STUDIES of Yugoslav anti-Axis resistance usually focus on the two 
movements which emerged after April I94I when Yugoslavia was 
drawn into the war that of the Communist leader Josip Broz-Tito 
and that of the Yugoslav army Colonel Dragoljub-Draza Mihailovic.' 
By contrast, this work seeks to shed some light on the Yugoslav 
contribution to the Allied war effort between the outbreak of World 
War Two in September 1939 and the Axis invasion of Yugoslavia in 
April I 94 1, when the country was neutral. The policy of neutrality was 
directly linked to the shift away from Belgrade's traditional allies. 
Feeling abandoned by the British and the French, the Yugoslavs, under 
the governments of Milan Stojadinovic (I935-39) and Dragisa Cvet- 
kovic (I 939- 194 I), had moved closer to Germany and Italy. The fall of 
Dejan Djokic is a PhD student and Teaching Assistant in the History Department, School 
of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London. 
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York, I998; Mark C. Wheeler, Britain and the War/jor Yugoslavia, I940-1943, Boulder, CO, 
I 98o (hereafter Britain and the Warfor Yugoslavia). 
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Czechoslovakia seemed to have justified their fear that the Western 
democracies would do little to protect their smaller allies. By the time 
war broke out in September I 939, Yugoslavia, like other East-Central 
European states, had become increasingly tied to Germany.2 It is in 
this context that any individual case of Yugoslav anti-Axis resistance 
between 1939-4 I should be understood. 
The traditional approach seems, at first sight, fully justified. The last 
week of March and the first half of April I 94 I represent a turning point 
in Yugoslavia's history. During this brief period the Yugoslav govern- 
ment which signed the Tripartite Pact in Vienna on 25 March, was 
overthrown by a military coup in Belgrade two days later, and, as a 
consequence, the country was invaded. The army which was unpre- 
pared and outnumbered was defeated and Yugoslavia's occupied 
territory was partitioned between Germany, Italy and their allies, both 
outside and inside Yugoslavia. The army's defeat meant the defacto end 
of the country, but Yugoslavia nevertheless continued nominally to 
exist, through its exiled 'revolutionary' government and young king, 
and also as an idea.3 The two resistance movements that emerged in 
the months following the Axis invasion both fought in the name of 
Yugoslavia, albeit imagining it in mutually exclusive ways. By the end 
of I 941 conflicting ideas of a restored Yugoslav state, as well as radical 
differences in tactics and ideology, were the main reasons why the two 
movements were embroiled in civil war, revolution, and resistance to 
foreign occupiers and their collaborators.4 
As already stated, this article is concerned with those Yugoslavs who 
joined the Allies while Yugoslavia was still a neutral country. An 
attempt is made to analyse, for the first time, the little known role of 
Vane Ivanovic, a shipping magnate and an eminent Yugoslav sports- 
man, who belonged to neither of the two resistance movements, but 
who joined the British well before April I 94 1. Already on 4 September 
1939, 'the first working day of the war',5 Ivanovic had placed ten ships 
in British service, acting on behalf of Bozo Banac (I883-1945), his 
2 For Yugoslavia's international position in the late 1930s see Jacob Hoptner, Yugoslavia in 
Crisis, I934-I94i, New York and London, I 962, especially pp. I 70-201. 
3 Stevan K. Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia, London and New York, I971 (hereafter rugoslavia), 
p. I09. 
4 There is not to this day a good, general study of Yugoslavia in the Second World War. 
For a concise analysis see Pavlowitch, Yugoslavia, Chapter 3: 'The Chaotic Gap: I94I-45', 
pp. 107-I72 andJohn R. Lampe, Yugoslavia s Histoy: Twice There Was a Country, Cambridge, 
I996, Chapter 7: 'World War and Civil War, I94I-I945', pp. 197-228. Two memoirs, one 
by a leading Communist and the other by a close aide of Mihailovics stand out for their 
balance and insight: Milovan Djilas's Wartime, London, 1977, and Zvonimir Vuckovic's two 
volumes, Sedanja iz rata, London, i 980, and Od otpora do gradjanskog rata, London, 1984, 
respectively. 
As Ivanovic liked jokingly to say (interview with Vane Ivanovic, London, 2 July I 998). 
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stepfather and chairman of Yugoslavia's then largest shipping company, 
Jfugoslavenski Lloyd (Yugoslav Lloyd). On 25 March 1941 Ivanovic 
placed the rest of his fleet of twenty-two ships under Allied command, 
refusing to follow his Government's decision to join the Axis. In the 
wake of the coup of 27 March and throughout April 194 I he played an 
instrumental role in organizing Yugoslav shipowners into the Yugoslav 
Shipping Committee. The Committee's immediate task was to prevent 
the handing over of Yugoslav mercantile ships in neutral waters to the 
Axis. 
The topic is approached from an unusual perspective in that it does 
not take account of what happened after Yugoslavia was forced into the 
war, but is instead solely concerned with the period from September 
1939 until April 1941. Apart from provoking further thought on the 
variety of methods which may be applied in studying the past, this work 
seeks also to draw attention to the need to 'relieve' (Yugoslav) history 
from its ideological and/or nationalistic burden.6 
I 
Ivan Stevan Ivanovic, better known as Vane Ivanovic, was born on 9 
June 1913 in Osijek to a Croat father and a Serb mother.7 His father, 
Ivan Rikard Ivanovic (i 88o- I949), a Vienna-educated lawyer, was 
one of the founders of the National Progressive Party (NNS) and a 
deputy in Croatia's Sabor. His mother, Milica (i 888- I 969), was a sister 
of Du'san Popovic who, alongside Svetozar Pribicevic, was a leading 
Serb politician in the ruling Croato-Serbian coalition, which also 
included the NNS.8 Pribicevid was the best man at Rikard's and 
Milica's wedding, and Ivan Lorkovic, the NNS leader and the leading 
Croat in the Coalition, was the godfather to their first-born son, Ivan 
Stevan Vane. 
6 This study was completed before Vane Ivanovic died on 4 April I 999. 
The following biographical data are based on Ivanovic's memoirs, LX: Memoirs of a 
Jugoslav, London, 1977 (hereafter LX). Two years later, the section dealing with the Second 
World War in Yugoslavia was published in Serbo-Croat as a separate book, under the title 
Drugo zvono: J7ugoslavya u ratu, I939-I945, London, I 979 (hereafter Drugo zvono). An updated 
translation in Serbo-Croat of the (whole) original, LX, entitled (just) Drugo zvono, was 
published first in Croatia (Zagreb, 1993), and than in Serbia (Belgrade, I995; second 
edition, I 998). 
8 It is still unclear why Dugan Popovic left politics immediately after unification. One of 
the ablest champions of the Yugoslav cause in the Habsburg Empire, Popovic was expected 
to play a prominent role once a Yugoslav state became a reality. There are several possible 
answers, including the belief that with Yugoslav unification his political activity had 
achieved its ultimate aim, or disagreements with Pribidevic or family reasons. 
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After Vane's parents divorced in I92I, Vane and his brother and 
sister moved to London, where Milica's second husband, Bozo Banac, 
was based. Banac was a leading Yugoslav shipowner, expanding his 
father's small, Dubrovnik-based, shipping business so successfully that, 
in 1905, he had moved his office to London and joined the Baltic 
Shipping Exchange.9 Like many Dalmatians of his time, Banac was a 
strong believer in Yugoslav unity. 10 In July I 914, following the Austro- 
Hungarian attack on Serbia, he had visited the Serbian Legation in 
London and asked for Serbian citizenship, placing his mercantile fleet 
under the flag of the land-locked kingdom. During the war Banac 
collaborated with and financially supported the Yugoslav Committee, 
a group of exiled Croat, Serb and Slovene intellectuals who propagated 
the Yugoslav cause from their headquarters in London." He also 
helped create the British Adriatic Mission, which facilitated the safe 
passage of the retreating Serbian troops from northern Albania to the 
Greek island of Corfu in January i9i6. 2 After the First World War 
Banac had been a member of the Delegation of the Kingdom of Serbs, 
Croats and Slovenes at the Paris Peace Conference, heading its section 
for shipping matters at the beginning of 19I 913 and participating in 
unofficial negotiations with Italy over the succession of the former 
Habsburg fleet.'4 Apart from helping his fellow South Slavs, Bozo 
Banac had also therefore indirectly contributed to the British war 
effort something he was to repeat in 1939, both in his own right and 
through his stepson, Vane Ivanovic. 
Brought up in a milieu which not only believed in the idea of 
Yugoslav unity but which also very much participated in the creation 
of the 'first' South Slav state in I9I8, it is no surprise that Ivanovic 
developed a Yugoslav identity a feeling of belonging to the Yugoslav 
Ivanovic, LX, pp. 123-24. 
10 Banac's Yugoslavism must not be confused with the official Yugoslavism, introduced 
with King Alexander's dictatorship in 1929. A leading businessman, he was one of those 
genuine Yugoslavs who was not close to the Royal Court. London, Public Record Office, 
Foreign Office, FO 37 I /23880 'Note on personality of Bozo Banaz'. 
" 
'Bozo Banac to R. W. Seton-Watson, Rome, io December I914' and 'R. W. Seton- 
Watson to Ante Trumbic, London, I3 March 1915', in Hugh and Christopher Seton- 
WVatson et al. (eds), R. W. Seton-Watson and the rugoslavs: Correspondence I906-I941, 2 vols, 
London and Zagreb, 1976 (hereafter Correspondence I906-I94I, I, pp. I89-90 and p. I98, 
respectively; Ljubinka Trgovcevic, Nau nici Srb#je i stvaranje Jugos/avje, 19 19-1920, Belgrade, 
I 986, p. I 6 I; Ivanovic, Drugo zvono (i 998), vol. i, p. 9 I. 
12 'Bozo Banac to R. W. Seton-Watson, Rome, 26 November I915' and 'Bozo Banac to 
R. W. Seton-Watson, Rome, 9 December 1915', in Hugh and Christopher Seton-Watson 
et al., Correspondence i906-194I, I, pp. 252-55. For the British Adriatic Mission see C. E. J. 
Fryer, The Destruction of Serbia in 19 15, Boulder, CO, 1997. 
13 London, Vane Ivanovic Papers (hereafter VIP): 'Delegation du Royaume des Serbes, 
Croates et Slovenes a la Conference de la Paix'; Andrej Mitrovic, Jugoslavja na Konferenc#i 
mira, 19 I9-I920, Belgrade, I969 (hereafter Jugoslavia na Konferenc(ji mira), pp. 30-31. 
14 Mitrovic, 7ugoslavija na Konferenc'ji mira, p. 32. 
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nation. Life in Britain and the education he received there (Westminster 
School, London, and Peterhouse, Cambridge, where he read Econom- 
ics), had undoubtedly bolstered yet another identity that of a special 
attachment to the British which partly explains his later action. 
During the mid-thirties, Ivanovic returned to Yugoslavia to do his 
military service (i933-34), afterwards spending some time working in 
the Trepca mines in present-day Kosovo, which at that time were 
under British ownership. He also participated in the I936 Berlin 
Olympics as a member of the Yugoslav team, running the I I o-metre 
and 400-metre hurdles. 15 
When World War Two broke out, Ivanovic was in charge of Yugoslav 
Lloyd's London office. As this was the second most important office 
(after the one in Yugoslavia), he was defacto the deputy-director of the 
company. On his stepfather's instructions, Ivanovic had on 4 Septem- 
ber I939 contacted the Ministry for War Transport, which was still 
being formed, offering to place ten ships under British command. 
Thus, Banac and Ivanovic were the first shipowners from any neutral 
state to join the British. To avoid an open conflict with the Yugoslav 
government, Banac formed a separate British-registered holding 
company, Crest Shipping Company Ltd, which was operated by 
Ivanovic. Two new ships with British crews were bought to form the 
company's small fleet.'6 Dealings with the British could be covered by 
this company, but it was also used to provide British seamen for the 
Yugoslav Lloyd ships, in those rare instances when Yugoslavs refused 
to sail in war-zones on grounds that their country was neutral. '7 
But, even neutral ships were not safe. On the night of I3/I4 
November I939, a mine sunk the Carica Milica, a vessel of Yugoslav 
Lloyd's mercantile fleet and one of the largest Yugoslav steamers in the 
inter-war period.'8 Milorad Miljevic, the ship's captain who, along 
with the rest of the crew survived the sinking, told BBC radio that the 
ship had been sunk by a German mine. Soon the Yugoslav Minister to 
London, Ivan-Vanja Subbotic, telephoned Ivanovic's office, protesting 
1 5 In the i I o--metres he reached the semi-finals in Berlin. In both disciplines Ivanovic held 
Yugoslav records, in the 400-metres for as long as seventeen years (I 936-53). Ivanovic, LX, 
pp- I 56-59. 
16 Telephone conversation with Vane Ivanovic, London, I 3 July I 998. 
7 VIP: Untitled typescript by Vane Ivanovic, no date, p. I. 
18 All mercantile vessels in the inter-war period were steamships. Built in I928, Carica 
Milica had a capacity of 9,950 tons. At the time it was sunk, it was carrying coal from 
Britain to Yugoslavia. Ivo Sisevic, 'Naga trgovacka mornarica za vrijeme II svjetskog rata', 
Pomorski zbornik: povodom 20-godisnjice mornarnce i pomorstva fugoos1av#e I942-i962, Zagreb and 
Zadar, I962 (hereafter Nasa trgovacka mornarica), i, p. 8I4. Sisevic incorrectly states that 
Carica Milica was the largest Yugoslav ship of that period. Two other ships, Triglav and 
Avala, also owned by the Yugoslav Lloyd, were larger, though Carica Milica was the most 
modern Yugoslav ship of that time. Vane Ivanovic to Dejan Djokic, fax, Dubrovnik, 2 
August I998. 
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at Miljevic's open accusation of Germany. 'Don't you know that we 
are neutral?!' Subbotic asked angrily. Ivanovic shouted back: 'You and 
your government may be neutral, but I am not!'.'9 
II 
At the beginning of World War Two, Yugoslav Lloyd was worth around 
$I,200,000. Bozo Banac was the major shareholder, with around 40 
per cent of the company's stock, worth approximately $480,ooo.20 By 
placing their fleet under the Allied flag, Banac and Ivanovic were not 
only risking a confrontation with the Belgrade government, but also 
putting all this capital at risk.2' Their actions were due to their 
anglophilism, disagreements with Yugoslavia's foreign policy and their 
belief that Britain was the best guarantor of the trading interests of 
small states. As Ivanovic later recalled, Banac's view was that 'So long 
as Great Britain dominated the oceans and seas, the small nations, like 
ours [Yugoslav], will be allowed to sail freely. A German victory [. . 
would mean an end of free passage for small nations'.22 
Bozo Banac was in France when Germany invaded. After being cut 
off for several months in the south of the country, he eventually 
managed to move to Switzerland. During this period, the company was 
completely operated by Ivanovic.23 The fall of France in June 1940 
meant it was only a matter of time before London was attacked from 
the air. As it would have become impossible to remain in constant 
touch with his fleet, Ivanovic decided to move to Yugoslav Lloyd's 
office in New York, in the neutral United States.24 An additional reason 
for Ivanovic's departure to the United States was preventive in nature. 
A majority of Yugoslav Lloyd's assets were already there and were in 
danger of being frozen by the US Government in the event of an Axis 
attack on Yugoslavia. Ivanovic hoped that his presence would prevent 
this from happening.25 The departure from London of the young heir 
to Yugoslav Lloyd did not go unnoticed by the Foreign Office.26 Ashley 
"Interview with Vane Ivanovic, London, ioJuly I998. See also Drugo zvono (1979), p. 23. 
20 Interview with Vane Ivanovic, London, I O July I 998; VIP: Untitled typescript by Vane 
Ivanovic, no date, p. i. 
21 Even those ships not placed directly under British command were used indirectly to aid 
Allied interests. For example, four of Yugoslav Lloyd's ships were hired by the Australian 
government, though the Japanese had offered a more favourable deal. See FO 37 I /29772, 
Bozo Banac to the British Legation in Bern, Geneva, 31 March I941. 
22 Ivanovic, Drugo zvono ( 979), p. 22. 
23 VIP: Untitled typescript by Vane Ivanovic, nIo date, p. i. 
24 Ibid. p. 3; Ivanovic, Drugo zvono (I979), p. 24. 
25 Ivanovid, Drugo zvono (I979), pp. 24-25. 
26 FO 37 I /28789, Weston to Sparks, London, 24 August 1940. 
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Sparks of the British Embassy in Washington was informed that 
Ivanovic had been responsible for the transfer of 'one half of [the] 
Banaz fleet', and that the Foreign Office would like to be kept informed 
of his activities.27 
III 
When it became likely that Yugoslavia would sign the Tripartite Pact, 
Ivanovic appealed from New York to Prince Paul not to do so. He even, 
rather naively, offered his mediation in renewing close links between 
Belgrade and London.28 Ivanovic also telephoned his cousin Mara, 
Yugoslav Prime Minister Cvetkovic's wife, asking her to try to dissuade 
her husband from binding the country to the Axis.29 
When the Yugoslav government signed the Tripartite Pact on 25 
March 1941, Vane Ivanovic was still in New York. Upon hearing the 
news, he immediately flew to Washington to meet the Yugoslav 
Minister there, Konstantin Fotic. Together with Vladimir Rybaf of the 
Yugoslav Legation, Ivanovic met on the same day with Frederick 
Hoyer-Millar, Councillor of the British Embassy in Washington.30 He 
told Hoyer-Millar that he did not intend to respect his government's 
decision to join the Axis and that from that moment all ships under his 
command were to be considered Allied ships. He also added that he 
was hoping the situation in his country might be reversed.3' Other 
Yugoslav shipowners in the United States expressed similar discontent, 
and the New rork Times published a first-page article on the Yugoslav 
shipowners who were offering their help to the British.32 In support of 
his action, Ivanovic declared that it was his duty as an individual to 
fight for freedom and peace, and that he believed that it was also in the 
best interests of his own country.33 
The Foreign Office, however, was still unclear as to what to do with 
the Yugoslav-owned ships in neutral waters. Viscount Halifax, Britain's 
Ambassador to Washington, was asked to advise the Yugoslav shipown- 
ers to instruct their captains not to surrender their ships to the Axis and 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ivanovic, Drugo zvono (i 979), p. 33- 
29 Ibid. 
30 FO 371/28789, Viscount Halifax to Foreign Office, Washington 25 March 194I. The 
staff of the Yugoslav Legation in Washington were also against the government's decision, 
and Fotic promptly resigned in protest after the news from Belgrade was confirmed. He was 
soon to withdraw his resignation. 
31 Ibid.; Ivanovic, Drugo zvono (I 979), p. 34. 
32 'Yugoslavs in U.S. ready to transfer 25 ships to Britain', TheJ'ew York Times, 27 March 
I 941. 
33 Ibid. 
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to avoid neutral waters, except those belonging to the US.34 After the 
Belgrade coup the situation changed, as it was no longer necessary, in 
the British view, to transfer the Yugoslav ships directly to the British.35 
The Yugoslav shipowners were, nevertheless, advised to stay in direct 
contact with Ashley Sparks of the British Embassy in Washington.36 
Ivanovic met Sparks in New York on 26 March, one day after his 
visit to the British Embassy and a day before the coup in Belgrade.37 
They discussed the transfer of the remaining ships owned or controlled 
by Yugoslav Lloyd to the British.38 A second meeting took place the 
following day, when the news from Belgrade had already reached both 
of them. According to Ivanovic, Sparks welcomed him 'with open 
arms' and the words, 'My boy'.39 Ivanovic's enthusiasm was not spoiled 
even when Sparks told him that he was joining the British Navy at the 
time when it was suffering its heaviest losses.40 Sparks may have had in 
mind the loss of the British cruiser York, severely damaged by Italian 
torpedo boats in Suda Bay, Crete on 25 March, and the sinking of as 
many as sixteen merchant ships in the Atlantic between I5 and I7 
March.4' Yet, what neither Sparks nor Ivanovic knew at the time was 
that on the very day of their meeting the British had just destroyed 
nearly all the Italian Navy in the Adriatic in the battle of Cape 
Matapan.42 
The speed of events had transformed Ivanovic overnight from a 
shipowner to a hero. Newspaper and radio interviews followed, the 
American journalists being rather disappointed to learn that Ivanovic 
had not played some part in the Belgrade conspiracy against Prince 
Paul and his government.43 In fact, Ivanovic, like the majority of 
Yugoslavs, including both Tito and Mihailovid, did not even know of 
34 FO 37 1/28789, Foreign Office to Halifax, London, 26 March 1941. 
35 FO 37 I1/38789, Foreign Office to Halifax, London, 27 March 1941. 
36 Ibid. 
3 Ivanovic, Drugo zvono (I 979), p. 35. 
38 Ibid. 
39 Ivanovic, LX, p. 206. 
40 Ivanovic offers an interesting account of pro-Yugoslav (or anti-Nazi?) feeling in New 
York on 27 March, ibid., pp. 206-07. For the enthusiastic reception of the news from 
Belgrade in the United States, see also 7The New York Times, The New York Herald Tribune and 
W'ashington Post of 28 March 1941. 
41 Martin Gilbert, ne Second World War, London, 1995, pp. I 62-65. 
42 Ibid., p. i p66. 
43 Ivanovid, LX, P. 206. 
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the conspiracy's existence.44 Yet, like many Yugoslavs, he supported the 
overthrow of the regime which had signed the Tripartite Pact. Anti- 
Axis demonstrations on the streets of Belgrade, Kragujevac, Nis and 
other smaller towns conveniently overshadowed the assurances the new 
Prime Minister, General Dusan Simovic, sent to Berlin, that his 
government would respect the agreement signed by the previous 
government. Concerned for the country's unity, Ivanovic sent a cable 
to Vladko Macek, leader of the Croatian Peasant Party, appealing to 
him to join the new government and to stand by the Serbs and the 
Slovenes, so preventing Germany from using Croatia as a Yugoslav 
Slovakia.45 
Simultaneously, the British Legation in Belgrade was instructed by 
the Foreign Office to urge the Yugoslav government to 'remove to 
safety' its mercantile navy.46 It was not stated precisely what was 
considered 'safety', but from the document it is possible to assume that 
it was the British-controlled waters in the Middle East. According to 
the plan, in case of a German attack on Yugoslavia, mercantile ships 
which had been removed earlier would sail back to the eastern 
Mediterranean, via the Suez Canal, carrying aid to the Yugoslav 
troops.47 The British also proposed the establishment of a shipping 
committee under the leadership of a renowned Yugoslav shipowner 
only Bozo Banac was suggested with its headquarters in London.48 
As there was no reply from the Yugoslav government, the British 
believed their proposal had been completely overlooked in Belgrade, 
44 Although, since the summer of I940 Mihailovic was aware of the discontent among a 
group of officers around General Borivoje Mirkovic, the main architect of the 27 March 
coup. Mirkovic invited him to attend meetings at which the officers, disgusted with the 
government's increasing detente with Germany, planned to overthrow Prince Paul. 
However, in October Mihailovic moved to Mostar, HerceSgovina, and only found out what 
happened when one of the leading conspirators, Major Zivan Knezevic, telephoned him 
after the coup. Dragoljub M. Mihailovic, Rat i mir djenerala. Izabrani ratni spisi. 2 vols, comp. 
Milan Vesovic, Kosta Nikolic and Bojan B. Dimitrijevic. Belgrade, I998,11, pp. 375-76. 
45 Ibid. Just as in 194 1, when he appealed to Prince Paul, Cvetkovic and Macek, fifty years 
later in the last months of the 'second' Yugoslavia, Ivanovic sent two letters to Presidents 
Milosevic of Serbia, Tudjman of Croatia and Kucan of Slovenia, appealing to them to 
preserve a Yugoslav state, since the alternative could lead to bloodshed. The first was an 
open letter, published in Nedeljna Borba (Belgrade), 26-27 January I99I, while the second 
was written on 26 June, the day after Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from 
the rest of the country. In the second letter, Ivanovic, as 'the son, nephew and godson of the 
three Serbs and Croats who had in I9I8 been among the creators of the first common, 
democratic, state of the Yugoslav peoples', offered to organize a meeting in Dubrovnik of 
the three presidents and other leading politicians, which surely would have been the last 
attempt to solve the impending crisis at the negotiating table. No one even bothered to 
reply. For the text of the letters see Drugo zvono (I 993), pp. 34 I -47 or Drugo zvono (I 995), II, 
pp. I93-201. 
46 FO 371/28789, Foreign Office to the Belgrade Legation, London, I April 1941. 
48 Ibid. 
48 Ibid. 
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amid the dramatic changes.49 London had also contacted Bozo Banac 
early in April, inviting him to leave Switzerland for London. Banac's 
reluctance to come to London was interpreted by the British Consul in 
Geneva as 'waiting to see which way the Yugoslav cat jumps'.50 This 
insinuation was rejected in London, where Banac was seen as 
'exceedingly pro-Allied'.5' The real reason behind Banac's reluctance 
to come to London was the fact that his stepson, in whom he had full 
confidence, was due to arrive in the British capital. Ivanovic had just 
been named the president of the Yugoslav Shipping Committee, a 
newly founded organization of Yugoslav shipowners, with its head- 
quarters in Yugoslav Lloyd's New York office.52 In any case, Banac's 
poor health also deterred him from making the trip: a telegram from 
the British Embassy in Lisbon mentions Banac's heart problems.53 
IV 
It is difficult to establish the exact date when the Yugoslav Shipping 
Committee (YSC) was founded. In his memoirs Ivanovic states that he 
had contacted other Yugoslav shipowners, among them Lujo Radonicic 
and Frano Petrinovic, or their representatives in the USA, on 6 April 
1941, immediately upon hearing that Yugoslavia had been attacked by 
the Axis. He proposed an urgent meeting and suggested that they 
organize themselves as a committee, based on the model of the Greek 
Shipping Committee in London.54 The proposal was accepted, and 
Ivanovic, although the second youngest among them, was elected the 
first president of the Yugoslav Shipping Committee.55 Six days later, on 
12 April, Ivanovic and other Committee members met in Baltimore 
with Yugoslav officers and sailors to discuss their representation in the 
Committee. Ivanovic proposed that a new collective agreement which 
4 FO 371/28790, 2 May 1941. 
50 FO 371/28789, Kelly to Foreign Office, Bern, 6 April 1941. 
5 FO 371/28789, minutes, 7 April 194I. The British Consul, Livingston, was described 
as somewhat hysterical officer ... .] undoubtedly exposed to a very considerable sham'. 
52 FO 371/28790, telegram from Lisbon to Foreign Office, 5 May 1941. 
5 Ibid. Ivanovic also mentions Banac's poor health, 'heart ailment, dormant from early 
youth, [which] had developed into dropsy', LX, p. 137. 
54 Ivanovic, LX, p. 208. 
5 Ibid. Ivanovic explains his election as the recognition on the part of the other shipowners 
of his unreserved support for Britain since the beginning of the war. 
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would regulate wages and insurance in war conditions, should be 
signed between shipowners and sailors and this was accepted.56 
A slightly different version is given by Ivanovic's younger brother 
Vladimir (1917-63) in his unpublished history of the Yugoslav 
mercantile fleet during World War Two. According to him, the 
Yugoslav military attache in the USA, Colonel Mirko Burja, addressed 
the Baltimore meeting of 12 April.57 Two days later, Vladimir Rybar 
of the Yugoslav Legation in Washington spoke at another meeting of 
Yugoslav shipowners and seamen in the US waters, and proposed they 
select their representatives for a shipping committee, which they did.58 
He confirms that the new collective agreement was signed on 29 
April.59 Vladimir Ivanovic clearly suggests that the Yugoslav diplomatic 
and military representatives in America played an important role in 
the creation of the YSC. If this is true, then the Foreign Office was 
mistaken in believing that their proposal of early April had been 
neglected in Belgrade. 
It is quite possible, however, that Konstantin Fotic, the Yugoslav 
minister to Washington, acted independently of his government. All 
that we know from his memoirs is that he had talked to representatives 
of the Yugoslav shipowners in America sometime in the second half of 
March I94I 60 Perhaps Fotic had his meeting with Vane Ivanovic in 
mind.61 But neither his memoirs nor the published documents on 
American foreign relations offer any further clue.62 The official post- 
I 945 Yugoslav historiography is even less helpful. Apart from conclud- 
ing that Yugoslav shipowners in neutral and Allied-controlled waters 
were there primarily for 'commercial interests, class consciousness and 
war profiteering', we find the false information that the YSC was 
56 Ivanovic, IX, p. 209. The first collective agreement in inter-war Yugoslavia was not 
signed until I 938. Until then, relations between shipowners and seamen were regulated on 
the basis of individual agreements. Most of these agreements were published in ,Zbirka 
najnov jihpropisa opomorstvu i pomorcima, Dubrovnik, I 938. The new collective agreement was 
signed on 29 April I 94 I, and was to remain in force until the end of the war. 
57 VIP: Vladimir Ivanovic, typescript in English, entitled Booklet Vo. 0I03, completed in 
New York, June 1944 (hereafter BookletNo. oI03), p. 5. 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Constantin Fotitch (Konstantin Fotic), The War We Lost. rugoslavia 's Tragedy and the Failure 
of the [West, New York, 1948. Fotic mentioned this meeting to Sumner Welles, the US Under- 
Secretary of State, who came on 24 March to dissuade the Yugoslav Minister from resigning 
his post after the Belgrade government had signed the Tripartite Pact, pp. 70-7 1. 
61 Although Ivanovic went to see him on 25 March and Fotic dates his conversation with 
Sumner Welles a day earlier, it is very unlikely that the Yugoslav Minister would have met 
other shipowners without Ivanovid, who was not only running the largest Yugoslav 
mercanitile fleet, but who had openly supported the British from the beginning of the war. 
It seems that Fotid confused the dates. 
62 Foreign Relations of the United States. Diplomatic Papers, I94I, Vol. II Europe, Washington, 
DC, I959. Documents relating to Yugoslavia are between pages 937 84. 
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formed in New York at the end of 941 .63 Here we have an excellent 
example of history-writing not only through the prism of ideology, but 
also under the influence of events which took place after the episode 
about which the historian is writing. In the spring and summer of 1941 
it was impossible to predict which side would win, and it may be argued 
that it seemed more likely than that the Allies would lose. 
So when exactly was the YSC formed, and who initiated its 
formation? In his report to the Ministry of Shipping, sent on 4 April 
I941, Sparks states that the same morning a group of Yugoslav 
shipowners, led by Ivanovic, had met and formed a committee.64 The 
Foreign Office papers do not mention the two meetings of I2 and 14 
April. However, Halifax reported on I I April that an agreement 
between the Yugoslav Legation, Ivanovic and Radoniciic, as well as 
with the Maritime Commission, had been reached the same morning. 
According to this agreement, all Yugoslav mercantile ships were to be 
employed in accordance with the interests of the British Ministry of 
Shipping.65 The same report states that Ivanovic had asked to leave for 
London in order to organize a YSC branch there, with Radonicic 
taking charge of the New York headquarters.66 It seems appropriate, 
therefore, to say that the YSC was formed between 4 and 29 April 
194 1, between the first meeting of the Yugoslav shipowners in the USA 
and the signing of the new collective agreement between the shipowners 
and their crews. It is also safe to conclude that Vane Ivanovic, having 
rallied with his stepfather, Bozo Banac, to the Allied cause in September 
1939, continued to play a leading role in organizing other Yugoslav 
shipowners once Yugoslavia's neutrality came to an end in the spring 
of 194I 
With the formal capitulation of the Yugoslav Army on i 7 April 1941, 
Yugoslav assets abroad were in danger of being seized by the Nazis. To 
prevent the seizure of Yugoslav mercantile ships, Ivanovic, as the 
president of the YSC, asked Fotic to requisition the entire Yugoslav fleet 
in the name of his government.67 By this measure, the US Government, 
still neutral, would recognize the 'Yugoslav character' of the fleet, and 
could use this as an excuse to reject any Axis request to hand over 
Yugoslav ships. Although they did not know the government's where- 
abouts at that moment, and even though there was no appropriate law 
63 Sisevic, Nas'a trgovacka mornarica, p. 8 I I. 
64 FO 371/28789, Sparks to the Ministry of Shipping, New York, 4 April 1941. 
FO 371/28789, Halifax to the Foreign Office, Washington, i i April I 94 I. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Ivanovic, LX, p. 209. Ivanovic states that he was advised by Sparks to 'follow the Greek 
example'. 
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on requisition in Yugoslavia, Fotic, as the Yugoslav Minister, and 
Ivanovic, as the YSC president, proclaimed the 'requisition'.68 
V 
All ten ships which Yugoslav Lloyd had placed under British command 
on 4 September I939 had either been sunk or captured by 6 April 
194 1. Because Yugoslavia was still a neutral country, Banac and 
Ivanovic received the insurance money from the British. They used it 
to build another five ships, but these too had been lost by 1941i.69 Over 
the next two years Yugoslav Lloyd lost another ten ships, and by I943 
its fleet was down to two steamers.70 These two ships would survive the 
war, but were nationalized by the new Yugoslav authorities in I945.71 
The human cost was also very high. According to the YSC records, 
between April I94I and July 1943, 2II sailors of the Yugoslav 
mercantile fleet were either killed or went missing in action.72 A 
majority of them, 135 in all, were citizens of Yugoslavia, most probably 
of Croat origin.73 Having lost most of his fleet, Vane Ivanovic joined 
the British Army instead of going to Yugoslavia to join Tito or 
Mihailovic. In his memoirs he spells out the reason for this: 'I had no 
desire to forget the enemy and engage in a fratricidal war among my 
fellow countrymen, especially as I did not wholly agree with either 
side.'74 
Ivanovid was assigned to the Yugoslav section of the Political Warfare 
Executive (PWE). He spent the remainder of the war between London, 
Cairo and Bari and was demobilized as a major of the British Army.75 
After the war he re-launched a successful career in shipping and 
68 Ivanovic, Drugo zvono (I 9 79), p. 43. 
69 Vane Ivanovic to Dejan Djokic, fax, Dubrovnik, 2 August i998. 
7o Ibid. 
Ivanovic, Drugo zvono (I979), pp. 23-24. 
72 VIP: Vladimir Ivanovic, Booklet No. 0I03, Appendix i7: 'Jugoslav Seamen Killed or 
Missing From Jugoslav Ships Since April 6 194I till July I 943'. 
13 It is of course a pure speculation, since in Yugoslavia after I 929 there were, officially at 
least, only Yugoslavs. My opinion that most of them would today be considered Croat is 
based not only on their names, but also on the YSC list, which gives the place of birth 
the majority were born in Dalmatia, where Croats were in an absolute majority over Serbs. 
Besides, Croats traditionally chose the sailor's profession, as did an admittedly smaller 
number of Serbs from Dalmatia and Montenegrins. Speculation apart, what is certain is 
that all these sailors, whether they regarded themselves as Croats, Serbs or Yugoslavs, sailed 
the ships under the control of the rugoslav Shipping Committee and as such were loyal to 
the Yugoslav Government-in-exile. This is important to emphasize, as it is a popular 
conception today, paradoxically both in Serbia and Croatia, that only Serbs were pro- 
Yugoslav and that it was mostly they who fought on the side of the Government-in-exile 
and the Allies. 
74 Ivanovid, LX, p. I 8o. 
7Ivanovid, Drigo zvono (I 979), pp. 53-6 . 
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became a leading member of the Demokratska alternativa (Democratic 
Alternative), a group of democratic-minded Yugoslav emigre politicians 
opposed to Tito's regime.76 Although Vane Ivanovic and Bozo Banac 
had been among the first Yugoslavs and possibly the first neutrals of 
some significance -to join the Allies, the consolidation of Tito's 
regime in I 945 meant they could not return to their liberated country. 
While Banac died just days before the end of the war, Ivanovic became 
a political refugee. The irony is that the very same country Ivanovic 
and Banac had joined in I 939, subsequently provided substantial help 
to the regime which proclaimed them 'enemies of the people'. 
VI 
The main argument of this short study is that there were Yugoslavs who 
resisted the Axis before 6 April I94I, when Germany, Italy and their 
allies invaded Yugoslavia. Traditional history argues that the resistance 
was orchestrated by Tito and/or Mihailovic. Great Britain, which 
'stood alone', supported, mainly verbally, any resistance to the Axis, 
just as it had supported and encouraged the Belgrade coup d'etat of 27 
March I 94 I and just as it had welcomed Ivanovic's action. 
By analysing the little known role of Vane Ivanovic it is hoped this 
article has shown that the two main resistance leaders were not the first 
Yugoslavs to resist the Axis openly and in an organized way. To the 
present-day student of Yugoslavia in World War Two this argument 
may seem unconvincing. But, if for a moment we forget the subsequent 
events of 194I-45, it is not so unthinkable to claim that Ivanovic was 
the first Yugoslav to oppose the Axis. After all, when in September 
I 939, Ivanovid, a well known Olympic athlete and a leading shipowner, 
placed almost half of his fleet under the British command, Tito was 
General Secretary of the small and illegal Communist Party of 
Yugoslavia, controlled by the Soviet Union, which was at that time 
Germany's ally. Similarly, Mihailovic was a little known Yugoslav 
Army colonel. To the average Yugoslav living in the 1930s, Vane 
Ivanovic was a figure of some significance, unlike Tito or Mihailovic, 
of whom they were very unlikely to have even heard. The fact that Tito 
and Mihailovid played much more important roles during the course 
of the war does not diminish Ivanovic's action prior to the war in 
Yugoslavia. 
76 For the history and activities of the Democratic Alternative, see Ivanovic (I993), Ivanovic 
( 995), ii, and Vane Ivanovic, rugoslav Democracy on Hold, Rijeka, I 996, pp. 94-124. For a 
brief account of Ivanovic's post- I 4 activities see my obituary to Vane Ivanovic, T7he 
Independent (London), 9 April I 999. 
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There are two main conclusions to be drawn from this work. Firstly, 
in the case analysed here, hindsight has not proved beneficial to the 
writing of history, because the role of Ivanovic, who joined the Allies 
before Yugoslavia was attacked in April I 94 1, has been almost 
completely ignored. Further research on those Yugoslav individuals 
and groups who joined the anti-Axis resistance before the occupation 
of their country is necessary. Banac and Ivanovic were not the only 
Yugoslavs who collaborated with the British in this period. For example, 
the SOE had made contacts with the small (Serbian) Agrarian Party, 
with the organization of Chetnik veterans and also with some, mostly 
Serbian, but also non-Serbian military and political figures throughout 
Yugoslavia.77 Secondly, this case-study shows that writing history 
through popular ideology be it nationalist or internationalist 
gives us possibly a coherent but, nevertheless, a somewhat narrow and 
misleading view. This article is an attempt to break with that tradition. 
F or a brief summary of Britain's efforts to secure help from various Yugoslav 
organizations and individuals see Wheeler, Britain and the War for Yugoslavia, pp. 24-33. 
General Borivoje Mirkovic, who masterminded the 27 March I941 coup, was a friend of 
Tom Mapplebeck, Britain's honorary air attache in Belgrade before the war, and regularly 
passed him copies of the Yugoslav General Staff's weekly intelligence summaries (I am 
indebted to Dr Heather Williams, who interviewed Mapplebeck in I988, when he was 94, 
for this information). Dr Ivan Cok, a Slovene lawyer who held a nominal post in the 
Yugoslav Ministry of the Interior and who headed the 'Society of Yugoslavs in Italy' was in 
touch with Section 'D' (predecessor to Special Operations Executive SOE) since I939, 
and the 'Society' helped with sabotage in northern Italy, Slovenia and Dalmatia after the 
Axis invasion of Yugoslavia in April I94I (London, Public Record Office, Special 
Operations Executive, HS5/875, Bailey's memo, 24 November 194I. Again, I am grateful 
to Dr Williams for providing the reference). Another example of Yugoslavs joining the 
Allies prior to 6 April I941 was the little known case of three Yugoslav Army lieutenants 
Zvonimir Vuckovic, Momcilo Smiljanic and Sava -Konvalinka a Croat, a Serb and a 
Slovene, who fled to Greece rather than serve a pro-German Yugoslav government, but 
soon returned after the dramatic events of 27 March 194I. See Zvonimir Vuckovic's 
memoirs Secanja iz rata, London, I980, pp. 40--53. 
